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RULE MAKING AND ADJUDICATION IN
FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW*
ROBERT F.

FUQUAY**

Emphasis in government today is increasingly on administration.
The rapid growth of functions that are currently considered the proper
responsibilities of government has resulted in the creation of considerable governmental machinery, including many administrative
agencies. 1 This growth has occurred on both national and state levels.
At the present time the various state activities in Florida are administered by more than 120 organizational units, at least fifty of which may
be properly termed administrative agencies. 2 Since the administrative agency is primarily charged with the responsibility of discharging
the regulatory functions of government, it is with such agencies that
the great bulk of day-to-day citizen-government contacts are made.
Consequently great importance attaches to the legal problems in this
area.
As administrative agencies have played an increasingly dynamic
role on the American governmental scene a body of "administrative
law" has developed. Largely a phenomenon of the last half-century,
fluid and indeterminate in many respects, 3 it has as its task the definition of boundaries, limits, and methods of the various powers and
procedures of administrative agencies. Its significance for students,

*This article is a portion of the author's doctoral dissertation in political science,
written in 1952. The author records his debt to Dr. Ernest R. Bartley, Professor
of Political Science, University of Florida, who has edited the article and brought it
up to date.
"A.B. 1949, M.A. 1950, Ph.D. 1953, University of Florida; Assistant Professor of
Political Science, Oregon State College.
'The most commonly accepted definition of "administrative agency" limits the
term to those organs of administration that have "the power to determine, either
by rule or by decision, private rights and obligations." REP. Ar'y GEN. COsM. An.
PRoc. 7 (1941). The term will be so used in this article.
2FLoRIDA's STATE GOVERNMENTAL STRucTuRE 6 (U. Fla. Pub. Adm'n Serv. 1950).
3"The concept ... is vast, shapeless, and unrestricted -something which throws
itself across a great part of the entire field of our jurisprudence.... Its boundary
is uncertain. Its terminology is muddled. Its principles, while recognizable, are
definable, but with hesitancy." 42 Am. JUR., Public Administrative Law 290 (1942).
Further, the term "has not been subjected to precise definition by the courts." 73
C.J.S., Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure 295 (1951).

[260]
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practitioners, publicists, and the ordinary citizen is attested by its
vital concern with the basic problem of reconciling the necessity for
administrative powers over persons and property with the basic
American belief in respect for individual rights and freedoms.
In Florida as elsewhere the two principal tools of the administrative agency are found in the power to promulgate rules and to exercise adjudicatory authority. The blending of such powers in a single
agency effects in fact a virtual fusion of legislative, judicial, and
executive powers, though in theory such a fusion stands in contraposition to the doctrine of the separation of powers. From the agency
point of view the result has been to expedite and facilitate the conduct
of governmental regulation, but at the same time the apparent departures from traditional American governmental and legal theory
have created many problems. On the federal level much effort has
been made toward understanding, if not solving, these problems.
The federal Administrative Procedure Act is a manifestation of that
effort. In the various state jurisdictions, however, study has been spotty
and fragmentary, and the role of administrative law has been greatly
misunderstood. In looking at Florida administrative law, therefore,
a logical point of departure is an examination of the basic tools of
the administrative agency -rule making and adjudication.
RULE MAKING

It must be remembered and emphasized that the power of administrative agencies to promulgate rules is derived from statutes.
Subject to constitutional, judicial, and statutory limitations, rules
are designed to fill in the details of skeletal statutes enacted by the
legislature. In this view rules are a manifestation of legislative power;
they are traditionally referred to as being "quasi-legislative" in nature.
Actually a properly drawn and promulgated rule has the same practical legal force and effect as if enacted by the legislature itself and
may accurately be termed an example of "administrative legislation."'
CLASSIFICATION OF RULES

A preliminary step in proper classification is the ascertainment of
what agency actions are included under the term "rule."5 Serious
4BARTLEY, Introduction, PAPERS ON FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 13-15 (1952).
5The procedural rules of an agency may be contained in one or two pages,
while the substantive rules might occupy many times that number. Indeed, a
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procedural difficulties may arise from the inability to determine
whether an agency pronouncement is properly a rule. This inability
can be seen in the contrast between a rule and an order. Viewed categorically, a rule relates to future situations and is not addressed to
specific persons, while an order is an adjudicatory decision based
upon a particular set of facts and is applicable only to the parties involved. In actual practice, however, the distinction is sometimes unclear or completely lost.
Illustrative of the hazy line of division between the terms "rule"
and "order" is the question of whether the setting of rates is legislative or judicial in character. When action for the setting or revision
of rates is initiated by the rate-making body it is clear that the action
is legislative. The action may be effected by the application of a
single carrier, however, thus introducing elements of adjudication
that blur the distinction. Whether begun by the agency or on application of a carrier, hearings are held, evidence is heard, a decision
is made, and an "order" is entered. This procedure is the same as
that used in adjudication; it is typical of all rate-making bodies, such
as the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission. Upon
analysis the legislative nature of rate making becomes more apparent,
for, despite the procedure and the title accorded the decision, the
rates determined have future applicability and affect not only the
carriers directly involved but the entire class of carriers to which the
rate might apply. Thus rate making may be considered legislative
in character, and rate "orders" are actually rules. This is the view
adopted by the United States Supreme Court6 and the courts of the
7

states.

shocking number of Florida agencies operate without written rules of procedure.
In the case of licensing boards the procedure by which licenses may be revoked
or suspended is detailed in statutes, thus largely removing the need for written
rules. Further, the number of revocation and suspension proceedings brought by
such agencies is very small. On the other hand, the larger agencies, such as the
Industrial Commission and the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, have
carefully drafted written rules of procedure.
sIn Prentis v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908), the Court stated that
"a judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on
present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose
and end. Legislation, on the other hand, looks to the future and changes existing
conditions by making a new rule, to be applied thereafter to all or some part of
those subject to its power. The establishment of a rate is the making of a rule for
the future, and therefore is an act legislative, not judicial."
7E.g., Clear Creek Oil and Gas Co. v. Fort Smith Spelter Co., 161 Ark. 12, 255
S.W. 903 (1923); Cooper v. Tampa Elec. Co., 154 Fla. 410, 17 So.2d 785 (1944);
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Announcements, opinions, releases, rulings, practices, and usages
are other types of agency actions that may have the practical effect
of duly promulgated rules. Because of their random nature it is impossible to determine the prevalence and influence of these devices,
which are common to all governments.
Types of Rules. Generally, rules are regarded as falling into one of
three categories: substantive, procedural, or interpretative. Substantive rules delineate the conditions and bounds of activity in the area
regulated; they constitute the great bulk of rules issued by agencies.
The issuance of these rules constitutes a primary reason for the creation of the agency. Procedural rules relate to the manner in which
8
actions are taken before and by agencies. In contrast to substantive
and procedural rules, which are the product of a power to create new
law, interpretative rules are the product of interpretation of previously
existing law.
Since, in theory, the interpretative rule does not embody new law,
9
it is valid only if found judicially to be a permissible interpretation.
Inasmuch, however, as courts may apply all rules regardless of the
category to which the regulations are supposed to belong, the question
of whether a rule is interpretative or legislative is of no practical importance.' 0 Many interpretative rules are employed by Florida agenFlorida E.C. Ry. v. State, 79 Fla. 66, 83 So. 708 (1920); State ex rel. Railroad Comm'rs
v. Southern Tel. and Constr. Co., 65 Fla. 270, 61 So. 506 (1913); Alton & Sou. R.R.
v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 316 Ill. 625, 147 N.E. 417 (1925); Pennsylvania R.R. v.
Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 135 Pa. Super. 154, 4 A.2d 815 (1939); Missouri,
K. & T. Ry. v. Empire Express Co., 221 S.W. 590 ('rex. Civ. App. 1920).
8"The meaning of such a term as 'rule' must frequently depend not only upon
word contexts but also upon practical contexts." DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 190
(1951). CARROW, BACKGROUND OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 32 (1948), states that it is
necessary, in order to distinguish rules from orders, to analyze the nature of the
determination from the effect which it has. In Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. State, 73 Fla.
609, 632, 74 So. 595, 602 (1917), the Florida Court recognized this fact by stating:
"While it is undoubtedly true that the words, rule, regulation, and order are
it does not follow that these words always mean
frequently used as synonyms ....
the same thing or are interchangeable at will.... [T]he same word used in different
contexts may mean a different thing .... "
9DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 194-95 (1951).
ioMorgenthau, Implied Regulatory Powers in Administrative Law, 28 IowA
L. REv. 575, 593 (1943); see also CooPra, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS
254-62 (1951); PARKER, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW 200 (1952); Lee, Legislative and Interpretive Regulations, 29 GEo. L.J. 1 (1940); tenBroek, Interpretive Administrative
Action and the Law Maker's Will, 20 ORE. L. REv. 206 (1943).
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cies," but as yet the Florida Supreme Court has not passed on any
case in which it could consider the interpretative rule as such.
Mention must be made of the retroactive rule, a variation in the
classification of rules. Although there is federal precedent for such
rules,1 2 the Florida Court has not made a direct ruling. In a dictum,
however, the Court once observed: "Administrative regulations are
binding on those affected by them only when promulgated in due
course. They will not be permitted to be used in an ex post facto
13
manner as charged in this case."'
The Florida Legislature, in the unemployment compensation law,
has made a further distinction in the classification of rules. According to that statute:14
"General and special rules may be adopted, amended, or
rescinded by the [Industrial] commission only after public
hearing or opportunity. . . . Regulations may be adopted,
amended, or rescinded by the commission and shall become
effective in the manner and at the time prescribed by the commission."
Thus, for some undisclosed reason, the Legislature distinguished
the terms "rule" and "regulation." Historically these terms have been
used interchangeably by administrators, lawyers, judges, and commentators. No clue as to the basis of the distinction appears in any
part of the statute or in the legislative journals.
The classifications and variations set forth, while useful, are more
elaborate than the Florida courts have felt a need to accept. The
distinction between procedural and substantive rules is sufficient for
"lSee, e.g., Rule No. 8 of Passenger Bus Transportation Rules, adopted by the
Railroad and Public Utilities Commission; Securities Commission Rule No. 2; Rule
No. 201 of the Hotel and Restaurant Commission; and, generally, the bulletins of
the State Beverage Department.
12Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944).
13York v. State ex rel. Schwaid, 152 Fla. 285, 288, 10 So.2d 813, 815 (1943). Sec
also Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301 (1935), in which a determination of
nonliability for rates charged in the interim between the effective periods of identical
orders had the practical effect of giving retroactive validity to the earlier, invalidated
order.
'4FLA. STAT. §443.12 (2) (1955). In view of this provision the Industrial Commission has avoided the adoption of "rules" in favor of the more easily adopted
"regulations." The writer in 1952 was unable to discover any published rules relating to unemployment compensation, but regulations on the topic covered about
60 printed pages.
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present purposes, for it is within this framework that the decisions
of the Florida Supreme Court have been written. Moreover, administrators themselves are not prone to recognize further distinctions.
The Power to Promulgate Rules
Although Florida administrative agencies are not confined to narrow exercises of rule-making powers, 15 the powers are not without limitations. Since the agencies are creatures of statute,16 they must operate
within the confines fixed by the federal and state constitutions as well
as by the statutes themselves. Specifically, the rule-making power must
be either expressly or impliedly granted by statute and must be ex7
ercised in conformity with a statutorily provided standard or guide.1
Beyond the constitutional and statutory restraints there are limitations resulting from judicial interpretation. The Florida Supreme
Court, for example, has declared that rules may be issued only by
"officers" of the state government, not by subordinates or mere employees.' Further, when an administrative agency or officer exercises
15The rule-making power may be distinguished from the power to adjudicate
in that (1) rule-making is prospective in nature; (2) rules usually involve general
facts rather than data applicable to a single individual or situation; (3) rules do
not become concretely operative against an individual until proceedings of an adjudicatory nature are brought against him; and (4) rules are applicable to groups
rather than to an individual. It should be emphasized again, however, that in
borderline instances rule making and adjudication may become commingled.
16The sole exception in Florida is the constitutionally created Game and Fresh
Water Fish Commission.
17As in all other states, Florida administrative law embraces the nondelegation
doctrine. For the view that the doctrine constitutes a burdensome legal fiction, see

Fuquay, The Doctrine of Separation of Powers in Florida, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 48-56 (1952).

PAPERS ON FLORIDA

1Sn Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board v. Economy Cash and Carry
Cleaners, Inc., 143 Fla. 859, 197 So. 550 (1940), the Court refused to endorse an
order that permitted an employee of the Board to promulgate rules and regulations
governing the conduct of hearings, saying that such is an essential power of government that may not be exercised by one not a duly commissioned officer. In Tamiami
Trail Tours, Inc. v. Carter, 80 So.2d 322, 327 (Fla. 1954), the Court cited the Florida
Dry Cleaning case as authority for the statement that the Railroad Commission
could not "delegate the exercise of sovereign power to any of its employees." In
Blitch v. Buchanan, 100 Fa. 1202, 1206, 131 So. 151, 154 (1930), the Court observed
that "governmental functions requiring independent judgment, discretion and
authority, can in general legally be exercised only by officers who are elected by the
people or appointed by the Governor, unless otherwise *provided or permitted by
the Constitution." For a full discussion of this distinction see Waldby, The Public
Officer-Public Employee Distinction in Florida, 9 U. FLA. L. Rav. 47 (1956).
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official power, including that of rule making, it must be "authorized
by controlling law and must be reasonable and appropriate in the
method and extent of its application." 19 With these limitations the
administrative officer is still possessed of wide discretion in regard to
20
rule making.
Although the Florida Court has never fully defined the term "rule,"
it has given consideration to its meaning in terms of the power to prohibit. In State ex rel. Hollywood Jockey Club, Inc. v. Stein2 1 a rule
that forbade night racing was at issue. In answer to the Jockey Club's
contention that the rule was not in fact a rule but a prohibition, the
22
Court said:
"We think it might be safely said that in a general sense, the
power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit ....
However, every regulation commanding any act to be done in
a certain way impliedly and necessarily restricts or prohibits
the doing of the act in any other way. In this sense all powers
of regulation are to some extent prohibitory ... and if this
element nullified or invalidated rules and regulations it would
completely defeat and destroy a large part of the regulatory and
rule-making power vested by the Legislature in the various
boards and commissions .... "
A unique exception to the conventional patterns of law in relation to rule making is represented by the Game and Fresh Water
Commission, created by a constitutional amendment adopted at the
general election of 1942.23 Subsequently the Legislature granted rulemaking power to the Commission 24 in accordance with section 4 of
the amendment, which authorized the Legislature to "enact laws in
aid of" the provisions of the amendment. When the Commission's
I9Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. State, 106 Fla. 278, 290, 143 So. 255, 260 (1932).
20State ex rel. Mason v. Rose, 122 Fla. 413, 165 So. 347 (1936).
21133 Fla. 530, 182 So. 863 (1938).
221d. at 545, 182 So. at 869. In Ex parte Lewinsky, 66 Fla. 324, 63 So. 577 (1913),

a case involving a regulatory act passed by the Legislature, the Court, in replying
to a contention that the act was too restrictive, stated: "This assertion is untenable.
Every regulation is of necessity a restriction." This viewpoint was reiterated in
Ex parte Pricha, 70 Fla. 265, 70 So. 406 (1915).
23FLA. CONST. art IV, §30; see Young, Constitutional Position and Powers of the
Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, in PAPERS ON FLORDA ADmINITATivE LAW 75-89 (1952).
24F1a. Laws 1943, c. 21945, now FLA. STAT. §372.021 (1955).
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rule-making power was attacked in Sylvester v. Tindall25 the Supreme
Court suggested that rule-making authority might be implied from
the amendment itself but that such an interpretation was unnecessary
in view of the express authority delegated to the Legislature thus to
empower the Commission.
The most remarkable aspect of the Commission's rule-making authority, however, is a holding by the Court in a later case:2 6
"Acts of the legislature are limited to those that aid but are not
inconsistent with the regulations of the Commission. The
legislature may also fix penalties and license charges, but it
cannot abrogate a regulation of the Commission."
Here, indeed, is an exceptional situation. Traditionally, rules must
conform to statutes, but in this instance the rules take precedence. The
example is unparalleled in other jurisdictions.
Public Hearing
Due process of law does not require that all rules promulgated
by administrative agencies be preceded by notice and opportunity to be
heard. Although there is no hard and fast criterion that can be relied
upon to determine the necessity for notice and hearing, the yardstick
of fairness is generally the deciding factor.
In the case of procedural rules there ordinarily is little need for
a public hearing. Since procedural rules deal with the technical steps
of adjudication and not with rights that are usually the subject of
substantive rules, they thus exert little, if any, direct influence upon
the individual except in so far as adjudication procedure may be
used in the rule-making process. The absence of public notice and
hearing in the making of procedural rules has not proved to be a
problem, and the issue has not been raised in the Florida Supreme
Court.
The situation is less clear in regard to substantive rules. In some
instances fairness requires that notice and hearing be accorded, but
in others these processes are not necessary. If the Legislature by
statute provides that hearings must precede promulgation there is
25154

Fla. 663, 18 So.2d 892 (1944).

26State ex rel. Griffin v. Sullivan, 158 Fla. 870, 872, 30 So.2d 919, 920

(1947);
accord, Beck v. Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 160 Fla. 1, 33 So.2d 594 (1948);
Bronson v. State, 83 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1956).
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ordinarily no question; but when statutes are indefinite on the point,
or subjective administrative interpretation is possible, disputes may
arise. The power of administrative agencies to fix prices and hours,
for example, has resulted in a number of important decisions on the
point.2 7 The Florida Supreme Court has never made any categorical
statements to the effect that rules covering these subjects must be preceded by notice and hearing, but when statutes require this procedure
the Court insists upon strict compliance with the requirements of the
law.2S8 Beyond this the Court has been no more definite than to state
2
relative to price setting: 9
"[Nlotice and hearing must be given the public in strict compliance with the law. The law must require notice and give opportunity to be heard; it is not enough that the public get it
by chance. Otherwise the requirements of due process fail."
The italicized portion of the Court's statement, standing alone, would
give the categorical impression that notice and hearing must precede
price-setting rules. The Court, however, meant no more than that
when such procedure is required the statute must set forth a method
complete in all respects. The assumption upon which the statement
rests, nevertheless, is that fairness ordinarily necessitates notice and
opportunity to be heard.
In Milk Commission v. Dade County Dairieso a rule prohibiting
milk retailers from repurchasing bottles from consumers was challenged on the ground, inter alia, that no hearing had been held as
required by statute. Enforcement of the rule had the effect of pre27The validity of price-setting provisions was upheld in a number of decisions
during the 1930's, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co. v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 137 Fla. 508,
188 So. 91 (1939); Bon Ton Cleaners and Dyers, Inc. v. Cleaning, Dyeing & Pressing
Board, 128 Fla. 533, 176 So. 55 (1937); Economy Cash & Carry Cleaners, Inc. v.
Cleaning, Dyeing and Pressing Board, 128 Fla. 408, 174 So. 829 (1937); Miami Home
Milk Producers Ass'n v. Milk Control Board, 124 Fla. 797, 169 So. 541 (1936);
Mayo v. The Polk Co., 124 Fla. 534, 169 So. 41 (1936).
28SMiami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board, 134 Fla. 1,
11, 183 So. 759, 763 (1938).
29Robbins v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 153 Fla. 822, 824, 16 So.2d 121, 122
(1943) (italics supplied). The statute involved was invalidated on the ground of
lack of adequate standards rather than denial of due process because of lack of
provision for notice and hearing, The statute had previously withstood an attack
on the latter ground in McRae v. Robbins, 151 Fla. 109, 9 So.2d 284 (1942). The
McRae case was no more definite as to the necessity of notice and hearing.
30145 Fla. 579, 200 So. 83 (1940).
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venting rebates, thus maintaining the prices established by the Commission. Section 4, paragraph (hh), of the act empowered the Milk
Commission "to make, adopt, and enforce all rules, regulations and
orders necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act . ...3" In
other paragraphs of the same section the Commission was given
authority, after notice and hearing, to define milk marketing control
areas and set prices. In order to settle the question of whether due
process had been denied in the promulgation of the rule at issue,
the Court was compelled to relate the general rule-making clause
of paragraph (hh) to the other more specific provisions. The Court
32
decided in favor of the general provision, stating:
"As we construe the paragraph, it specifically authorizes the
Commission to adopt and enforce all rules and regulations
and orders necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act when
an area pursuant to public hearing has been established as a
control area. It is not required after an area has been established that the Commission give notice of a hearing before assuming to promulgate rules and regulations... but that such
order, rule, or regulation may be promulgated without notice
under statutory authority contained in paragraph (hh) ...."
Thus the Court validated a rule promulgated without hearing that
though not technically a price-setting rule had the same practical
effect.33
3Fla. Laws 1939, c. 19231, amended in 1953 to read: "The commission shall
adopt and enforce all rules and orders necessary to carry out the provisions of
" FLA. STAT. §501.05 (1955).
this chapter ....
32145 Fla. 579, 599, 200 So. 83, 91 (1940); see Alderman v. Puritan Dairy, Inc.,
146 Fla. 345, 1 So.2d 177 (1941).
33Even though Florida statutes that empower administrative agencies to set
prices contain provisions for notice and hearing, there is no statutory provision or
opinion of the Supreme Court that states categorically that due process is denied
when such provisions are omitted. Thus the Court was on solid legal ground,
inasmuch as the rule under attack did not, in and of itself, set prices. Cf. State
cx rel. State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 504, 179 At.
116, 125 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935): "In the absence of a specific constitutional or
statutory requirement thereof, notice of proceedings before the subordinate body
exercising, as here, the administrative function is not requisite to valid action by
that body. Nor is a hearing required in the absence of a provision therefor in the
organic or statutory law. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes no such requirement; and, for obvious reasons, the like- clauses in the
state Constitution bear the same construction."
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The promulgation of rules imposing quarantine represents another instance in which notice and hearing may be dispensed with.
Those agencies that are empowered to proclaim quarantines, however,
may not do so without first establishing the fact that there is a need
for such action.3 4 The determination is made through an investigation by officials and inspectors of the boards involved. Advance
notice of the effective date of the quarantine is required by statute,
but even this may be dispensed with in case of emergency, 35 though
it is rarely done.
In some instances the demands of due process in administrative
action may be met after the administrative process has run its course.
The theory is that recourse to the regular courts may serve in the
place of notice and hearing before the administrative agency. 36 In
State ex rel. Hurner v. Culbreath37 a statute provided that titles to
all lands with two-year-old outstanding tax certificates would revert
to the state. After certain lands belonging to Hurner were claimed
by the state, he brought action to compel their return, contending that
the act was invalid in that it did not provide for notice and opportunity
to protest. The Court ruled that Hurner had been informed of the
assessment and could have protested before the Board of County
Commissioners sitting as a board of equalization. Further, upon notice
of sale he could have sought relief in the courts.

34State ex rel. Wolyn v. Apalachicola Northern R.R., 81 Fla. 383, 87 So. 909
(1921) (quarantine rule held invalid because not based on sufficient evidence).
35FLA. STAT. §581.02 (1955), the act that grants powers to the Plant Board, imposes no restrictions in the promulgation of rules declaring quarantines other than
those contained in §581.03. All rules are to be promulgated by publication in the
official monthly organ of the board or by such other reasonable public notice as
may be prescribed by the board. The same section states that in case of emergency
quarantines may be made immediately effective by proclamation of the governor
on request of the board. FLA. STAT. §381.031 (1) (g) (1955), the statute that vests
the Board of Health with rule-making power, does not differentiate between
quarantine rules and rules of other types. The notice of quarantine, as in the

case of notice of other rules, is left to the discretion of the board. See also FLA.
§585.24 (1955).
3GThe leading federal case is Hagar v. Reclamation District, II U.S. 701 (1884).
The principle that the United States Supreme Court seems to follow in this type
of proceeding was expressed in Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396 (1934): "It
is enough that all available defenses may be presented to a competent tribunal
before exaction of the tax and before the command of the state to pay it becomes
final and irrevocable."
37140 Fla. 634, 192 So. 814 (1940).
STAT.
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Publication and Effective Date of Rules
Few phases of administrative law have been more chaotic in
Florida than that relating to the registering and filing of rules. For
many years no central collection point existed, and the individual
wishing to obtain the rules of even a small number of agencies was
forced to engage in voluminous correspondence with separate agencies. Even then it was frequently impossible to obtain copies of the
rules of some agencies.
The publication and effective dates of rules were usually governed
by the statute creating the board or agency, although in some instances
no provision was made. The statutory provisions for publication
varied widely. Safety rules for the Industrial Commission were
effective thirty days after being published in "such manner as the
Commission may prescribe."3 8 Rules of the Board of Health were to
be published "in such places and in such manner as they [the
Board] may deem best to give greatest publicity to same." 39 After
stating requirements for promulgation and effectiveness of rules the
Legislature added the statement that the requirements relative "to
promulgation and filing are directory and not mandatory. ' 40 And
so it went ad infinitum.
A good beginning toward correcting this situation was made by
the Legislature in 1955 when it enacted a statute relating to the filing
and effective date of rules. 41 The act, while far from perfect in its
operation, is a badly needed start. It provides that agencies shall
file their rules and regulations and amendments with the Secretary
of State, who must maintain the files open to the public.4 2 Rules
adopted prior to the January 1, 1956, cut-off date are not to be enforceable until filed; those adopted after January 1, 1956, are not
enforceable until fifteen days after filing. The effective date of filing
is reduced to five days upon the deposit of an affidavit stating that
an emergency affecting public health or safety exists; if actual notice
is given to the parties concerned, the rule becomes effective in that
38FLA. STAT. §440A6 (1941).
-19FLA. STAT. §381.16 (1941).
40FLA. STAT. §372.021 (1), (3), (5) (1941).
4'FLA. STAT. §§120.10-.17 (1955).

42The last section of the act appropriated funds to the Secretary's office for the
purpose of executing the act. The general appropriations act failed to pick up
the item. Hence the Secretary of State has been greatly handicapped in carrying
out the intent of the act.
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five-day period as well. Such rules cannot be admitted as evidence
43
in state courts until filed. Filing of procedural rules is not required.
The Secretary of State is authorized to charge a fee for making copies
of the rules. Names and addresses of chairmen or secretaries of boards
and agencies, and their successors in office, shall be filed with the
Secretary of State, and service of process upon the person last designated is declared valid.
Florida has no general administrative procedure act. This recent
filing law is, however, an initial effort to regularize administrative
procedure. If the act is implemented fully Florida will have a central
collection point for the substantive rules of administrative agencies,
accomplished without great expense, available to those practitioners
and members of the public needing them.
ADJUDICATION

The power of adjudication is a highly important part of the administrative process. It has become of great moment because the
factors that have made resort to the administrative process necessary
have also made the administrative agency the tribunal of first resort.
The Power to Adjudicate
In exercising adjudicatory power an administrative agency acts
in the manner of a court. The analogy, however, is not perfect, for,
even though agencies determine private rights and obligations, they
nevertheless do not take on all the characteristics of regularly consti44
tuted judicial tribunals.
The power of administrative agencies to hear and determine controversies is not a power inherent in the administrative agency. Rather,
like the power to make rules, it is derived from the statutes that provide for the creation of the agencies and vest them with authority.
The basic limitations upon the power of adjudication in the main
are much the same as those upon the rule-making power. The exercise
43Procedural rules are not denominated as such in the act.
44DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF THE LAW 23 (1927),
has summed up the nature of adjudication in the still applicable observation that
"administrative adjudication, unlike adjudication by a court, is not usually a separate and distinct process, - that is to say, it is not singled out by being the

isolated function of an independent agency existing and acting solely to perform
it, - but it is a mere moment, an integral part in a larger process, which is nothing
less than the carrying on of the business of government."
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of adjudicatory authority is circumscribed by statute, the restrictions
imposed by organic law, and by judicial interpretation.
Of especial importance to adjudication are the restrictive doctrine
of separation of powers and its companion the judge-made rule against
delegation.4 5 In view of the influence of these doctrines, adjudicatory
powers have been termed "quasi-judicial," even though the administrative determinations may have the same legal force and finality as
if made by courts. Thus administrative actions have been considered,
for the most part, as quasi-judicial acts.
The Florida Supreme Court has not set forth a specific definition
4
of quasi-judicial action. It has, however, made this general statement:
"It is the essential nature of the official act that determines
whether it is quasi judicial. If the action is taken on prescribed
adversary hearing and involves the exercise of independent judgment in determining controversies that directly affect adversary
legal rights or privileges claimed by individuals, it is at least
quasi judicial ..."
Viewed in this manner the similarity of administrative adjudicatory
power to judicial power is apparent. 47 Both involve a contested claim
predicated upon an asserted right, which is settled by one or more
officers exercising independent judgment after the adversary parties
have had opportunity to present their cases. Despite these similarities,
however, the Florida Court has held that proceedings before administrative agencies do not take on an essentially or fundamentally
judicial nature unless they are appealed to the regular courts.- s This
is true notwithstanding the fact that agencies may validly determine
legal questions arising in the course of the proceedings.&49
45See FLA. CONST. art. II; note 17 supra.
46Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'rs, 100 Fla. 538, 548, 129 So. 876,
882 (1930).
471n the early case of State ex rel. Arpen v. Brown, 19 Fla. 563, 596 (1883), the
Court indicated by way of dictum that statutory provisions that empowered a board
of county commissioners to suspend or revoke liquor licenses were invalid on the
ground that the board was thereby acting as a regular court of law. Later, in Harry
E. Prettyman, Inc. v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n ex rel. Branham, 92 Fla. 515,
524, 109 So. 442, 445 (1926), the Court corrected itself and stated that "the revocation of an occupational licensc is not essentially a judicial function. Such function
may be exercised by administrative or executive officers."
4sSouth Atlantic S.S. Co. v. Tutson, 139 Fla. 405, 190 So. 675 (1939); accord,
State ex rel. Hoffman v. Vocelle, 159 Fla. 88, 31 So.2d 52 (1947).
40State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 156 So. 705 (1934).
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The jurisdictional issue is basic to an exercise of adjudicatory power
by an administrative agency. The attitude of the Florida Supreme
Court on this point is illustrated by Six Mile Creek Kennel Club, Inc.
v. State Racing Commission.s0 A racing permit had been revoked for
failure to remit certain fees and taxes - the Commission took the
action simply for "good and sufficient reasons." On review the Court
held that the Racing Commission had exceeded its authority, stating: 5'
"There is no showing in the record here of any finding or
determination by the commission that the Kennel Club had
willfully failed and refused to pay the fees and taxes .... This
finding of fact and determination by the commission is a prerequisite to its jurisdiction to cancel a permit and license
granted."
Thus the Court required the agency to set forth in its order of
revocation a specific finding that cause for action existed. Note, however, that the Racing Commission was not required to make a formal
jurisdictional finding prior to the proceedings.
The Florida courts generally construe strictly the procedures permitted by statutory and organic law.52 This attitude arises from the
fact that individual rights are involved in administrative adjudication.
50119 Fla. 142, 161 So. 58 (1935).
51Id. at 145, 161 So. at 59; accord, State ex rel. Jordan v. Pattishall, 99 Fla. 296,
126 So. 147 (1930), in which one of the grounds for the issuance of a writ was the
failure of the Board of Dental Examiners to base a revocation proceeding upon
the causes specified by statute.
52E.g., State ex rel. Estep v. Richardson, 148 Fla. 48, 3 So.2d 512 (1941). In
State ex rel. Jordan v. Pattishall, 99 Fla. 296, 298, 126 So. 147, 148 (1930), the Court
stated that in construing statutes providing for revocation of licenses "the provisions
of the statutes must be strictly construed, and such provisions must be strictly followed, because the statute . . . is penal in its nature." The extent to which the
doctrine of strict construction can affect the jurisdiction of an administrative agency
is illustrated by Bie v. Mann, 50 So.2d 167 (Fla. 1951). The Real Estate Commission
suspended the license of a realtor who effected several transfers of property after
his license had expired. However, the Commission had granted renewal prior to
the suspension proceedings. In an action to review the suspension the Florida
Supreme Court held that the act of the Commission in granting the renewal was
such as to preclude the suspension proceedings. In Canada Dry Bottling Co. v.
White, 153 Fla. 70, 13 So.2d 595 (1943), the Court held that the Industrial Commission could hear only those workmen's compensation cases filed within a year
after injuries were sustained, notwithstanding the fact that one of two applicable
statutory provisions places no time limit upon the filing of such claims.
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Since traditional judicial procedure is not necessarily followed by
administrative agencies, strict construction by the courts serves to
53
some extent as a deterrent to possible arbitrary action by the agencies.
Investigation
The power of administrative agencies to conduct investigations
has received little attention in the courts of Florida. By contrast the
federal courts appear to have expressed themselves fully; they have
assumed a current approach that would allow certain federal administrative agencies motivated merely by "official curiosity" to "satisfy
themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the
public interest." 54
The administrative agencies of Florida appear to exercise a fairly
broad investigative power. Although the Supreme Court has not dealt
with the question frequently, in State ex rel. Kennedy v. Knott 5r it
ruled that the power of the Insurance Commission to inquire into
the books and papers of an agent is not violative of the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure.
Beyond judicial pronouncements, the extent and use of investigative power as outlined in statutes and as practiced by administra53

1n State ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth, 108 Fla. 607, 146 So. 660 (1933), a
physician appealed the revocation of his license on the ground that the board had
not acted in accordance with statutory provisions in regard to notice and hearing.
The board answered that the evidence was so conclusive against him that his appearance at the hearing would have had no bearing on the outcome. In resolving
the conflict the Court stated: "The law prescribes definite and specific requirements
for doing this and if these requirements are not followed the law is meaningless
and is no longer a rule of conduct to govern the high and low alike." Id. at 612, 146
So. at 662.
64United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950). This case represents
a much broader view than that stated in Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 827
U.S. 186, 209 (1946), in which agency investigation was limited to a "lawfully
authorized purpose, within the power of Congress to command," and a considerable
departure from Federal Trade Comm'n v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306
(1924), in which a unanimous Court, through Justice Holmes, stated that "fishing
expeditions" in "the hope that something will turn up" are "contrary to the first
principles of justice."
5 123 Fla. 295, 166 So. 885 (1936). The Court recognized over 40 years ago that
agencies must necessarily have the benefit of all available information. In State
ex rel. Railroad Comm'rs v. Florida E.C. Ry., 64 Fla. 112, 142, 59 So. 885, 895
(1912), it stated: "Before making an order within its authority, the Railroad Commissioners should carefully and duly enquire into and consider the interests of all
"
those who are directly and substantially affected by the order ....
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tive agencies must be examined. The Railroad and Public Utilities
Commission is an agency with broad investigatory powers, including
the authority to inquire into books and papers of individuals and
groups through the exercise of the subpoena power.5" The Industrial
Commission enjoys investigatory powers similar to those of the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission,5 7 as does the State Beverage
58
Department.
Investigation may take the form of generally "policing" the area
of regulation, or in some instances of using information gathered by
another, related agency. In some instances legal assistance in the nature
of investigation is provided by the office of the Attorney General or
by private counsel retained by agencies.
These practices are typical, but they do not answer the basic
question of whether a specific grant of power is necessary before an
agency may undertake general investigatory activity. The silence
of the Legislature in the face of need for such power would seem
to indicate a negative answer.
Subpoena Power. A necessary part of the power to investigate is
the power to issue subpoenas, for without this power an agency investigation would be largely dependent upon the co-operation of the
subjects of investigation. The position of the Florida Supreme Court
in regard to the manner in which the subpoena power may be exercised
has been inconsistent with actual practice. In Florida Dry.Cleaning&
Laundry Board v. Economy Cash & Carry Cleaners, Inc.59 the Court
indicated that the Board could not subdelegate to its chief supervisor
authority to issue subpoenas, despite a statute permitting him "such
salary, powers and duties as such board may delegate and provide."00
§§350.44, .45, .59-.61, .66 (1955).
§440A6 (1955) confers general investigatory powers upon the Industrial Commission in reference to workmen's compensation proceedings. Sec.
443.12 vests similar power in the Industrial Commission in regard to the administration of the unemployment compensation law.
58FLA. STAT. §561.29 (2) (1955) empowers the Beverage Department to make inquiries into the books and papers of companies and individuals subject to regulation.
59143 Fla. 859, 197 So. 550 (1940). The language of this decision on the
principle of subdelegation is quoted with approval in Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.
v. Carter, 80 So.2d 322, 327 (Fla. 1954).
60FLA. STAT. §515.04 (1941). This section, among others, was repealed by Fla.
Laws 1943, c. 21666, §1. The statute creating the Board was held unconstitutional
in Majors v. McLeod, 26 F. Supp. 206 (S.D. Fla. 1938).
56FIA. STAT.
57FLA.

STAT.
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This view, however, apparently has not been followed in practice by
either the Legislature6l or Florida's administrative agencies.
Subpoenas of the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission are
issued at the discretion and over the signature of the executive secretary. Subpoenas of the Industrial Commission are issued by the
general counsel at his discretion on forms signed by the chairman of
the Commission. A similar practice is followed by the Milk Commission, except that issuance is accomplished by the administrator. Discretion to issue subpoenas over their own signatures is enjoyed by
deputy insurance commissioners.
In the great majority of cases compulsory processes have not been
required for the appearance of witnesses and the production of records.
The extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its subpoena power, therefore, has not been litigated. Attempts to determine
limits must be deduced from statutory and constitutional provisions.
Guaranties against self-incrimination and unreasonable searches and
seizures obviously may not be violated. Such limitations as apply to
the power to investigate generally will also have inhibitory effects,
especially the elementary rule that administrative agencies must
operate within their statutorily designated jurisdictions.
Enforcement of administratively issued subpoenas in Florida follows the federal practice of compelling obedience by means of orders
issued by a regular court, violation of which is punishable as contempt
of court. This practice appears to have its origin in the observation
of the United States Supreme Court in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson 62 that the Commission "could not, under our system
GATypical of the statutory provisions that empower Florida administrative agencies to issue subpoenas is FLA. STAT. §467.14 (1955), which permits the Board of
Architecture to "issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses to testify
and to produce such books, papers or other documents in their possession before
the board or any member thereof relevant to any hearing or to any proceeding concerning any violation of laws regulating architects or the practice of architecture
.... " See also FLA. STAT. §601.71 (1955) (Citrus Commission), §350.59 (Railroad
and Public Utilities Commission), §458.122 (1) (Board of Medical Examiners),
§§440.33 (1), 443.12(8) (Industrial Commission). According to §56L29(2), "The
beverage director, or any assistant designated by him, shall have the power and
authority to examine into the business, books, records and accounts of any
licensee, and to issue subpoenas to said licensee or any other person from whom information is desired .... ."
02154 U.S. 447, 485 (1894). DAvis, ADmINisTRATivE LAw 121, n.151 (1951), remarks that the Brimson case "rests on the notion that the contempt power is

necessarily judicial." He cites Jurney v. McCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935), and
McGrain v. Daugherty, 275 U.S. 155 (1927), as authority for the statement that
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of government, and consistently with due process of law, be invested
with authority to compel obedience to its orders by a judgment of fine
or imprisonment."
The statutes that confer the subpoena power upon Florida administrative agencies generally provide that their enforcement shall
be by means of judicial orders. The one exception is found in the
statute relating to the powers of the Railroad and Public Utilities
Commission, which provides:6 3
"In case any person shall refuse or willfully fail to obey such
subpoena, subpoena duces tecum or other writ issued by commissioners, the said commissioners may issue an attachment for
such witness and compel him to attend before the commissioners
and give his testimony upon such matters as shall be lawfully
required by such commissioners; to bring and produce such
books or papers or documents required of such person, and said
commissioners may punish for contempt as in cases of refusal
to obey the orders and process of the circuit court of the state."
Granting to the Commission the power to punish for contempt directly
as though it were a court is a startling deviation from usual procedure,
but no question has been raised as to the validity of the provision.
No attempt has been made to exercise the power. To be noted, however, is the fact that several such provisions have been validated by
64
the courts of other states.
"This view has been rejected by later unanimous holdings that legislative bodies
may punish for contempt." CooPR, ADMNSTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS 129
(1951), and HART, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 370 (2d ed. 1950), are
in agreement with this point.
63FLA. STAT. §350.59 (1955).
64E.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. State, 19 Ariz. 20, 165 Pac. 303 (1917); Plunkett v.
Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911); In re Hayes, 200 N.C. 133, 156 S.E. 791
(1931); Vogel v. Corporation Comm'n, 190 Okla. 156, 121 P.2d 586 (1942). Contra,
People v. Swena, 88 Colo. 337, 296 Pac. 271 (1931); Langenberg v. Decker, 131 Ind.
471, 31 N.E. 190 (1892); In re Sims, 54 Kan. 1, 37 Pac. 135 (1894); Roberts v.
Hackney, 109 Ky. 265, 58 S.W. 510 (1900).
For a review of the various types of statutes following this pattern that have
been enacted and the manner in which the state courts have construed them, see
Note, 35 COLUM. L. R~v. 578 (1935). Parker, Contempt Procedure in the Enforcement of Administrative Orders, 40 ILL. L. REv. 344 (1946), takes the view, passim,
that judicial enforcement of administratively issued subpoenas is ineffective in
many instances, for the judicial process may prove to be slow and cumbersome when
prompt action is essential. Penfield Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 330 U.S.
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Notice and Hearing
The judicial process is characterized by the fundamental principle
that all parties to a controversy must be apprised of the nature, date,
time, and place of proceedings and be afforded an opportunity to be
heard. With some exceptions this is also true of administrative adjudication. As in the case of the rule-making power, the underlying
consideration in administrative adjudication is fairness, a vague concept that can be translated as meaning that the demands of due process
must be met.
The Supreme Court of Florida has stated generally that "the
essential elements of due process of law are notice, an opportunity to
be heard, and to defend in an orderly proceeding before a tribunal
having jurisdiction of the cause." 65 The law is well settled that administrative orders issued after administrative adjudication are void
if a hearing was denied or if the hearing was inadequate or unfair.66
The Court has further held that an order is invalid if made without
proper notice and hearing as contemplated by statute and the "fun'6
damental law." 7
a. Notice
Methods of notice prescribed by Florida statutes are both varied
and detailed; they allow the agencies little or no discretion. In workmen's compensation claims, for example, the claimant must be given
ten days' personal notice, while other parties may be notified by registered mail.68 Common and private contract carriers are afforded
fifteen days' notice by mail on issuance of certificates. 6 In revocation
proceedings the Securities Commission must serve the accused, by
registered mail, with a copy of the charges and notice of the date of
hearing not less than ten days prior to the hearing.70 The Board of
585 (1947), is an apt illustration of this view. By means of a series of appeals, four
years were required to secure obedience to a subpoena issued by the Commission.
65State ex rel. Munch v. Davis, 143 Fla. 236, 244, 196 So. 491, 494 (1940).
66State ex reL Burr v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 93 Fla. 104, 111 So. 391 (1927), in
which the Court relied on Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville 8=N.R.R., 227

U.S. 88 (1913).
67Murrell v. Real Estate Comm'n, 100 Fla. 130, 129 So. 339 (1930).
6SFL. STAT. §440.25 (3) (a) (1955).
60FLA. STAT. § §323.03 (2), .04 (2) (1955).
7OFLA. STAT.

§517.20 (1955).
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Optometry must give thirty days' notice of time and place of hearing.71
In the cases of the dental, massage, and chiropody boards the Legislature has prescribed the form of the notice to be used7 2
What actually constitutes adequate notice has been thoroughly
considered by the Florida Supreme Court. In State ex rel. Munch v.
Davis73 the Court, quoting from Corpus Juris Secundum, stated:
"'A method of service [of notice], although prescribed by
statute, is not sufficient if it does not amount to due process of
law; but due process is satisfied by timely and sufficient notice
of proceedings with an adequate hearing before a court of
competent jurisdiction, and no matter what its character, a
notice is sufficient if it actually results in bringing the party
into court in due time to protect his interests.'"
More specific rulings of the Court include a determination that an
agency must delay proceedings in the absence of positive proof that
notice has been served74 and that the accused must be informed with
reasonable certainty of the nature and cause of the accusation.75 The
Court has invalidated a license revocation on the ground, in part,
that there was no showing that a copy of the charges or notice of the
hearing was ever served on the accused7 6 Due notice must also afford the individual reasonable time to employ counsel and prepare
his defense'1 but a person may not ignore or evade service.78 To a
degree found in few other areas, Florida agencies have honored
these requirements. Although many variations in form have been
permitted, the Court has shown great concern in seeing that the
fundamental requirements of due process have not been infringed.
7'FLA. STAT. §463.11 (1955).

72See FLA. STAT. §480.12 (1955) (Board of Massage), §466.26 (Board of Dental
Examiners), §461.09 (Board of Chiropody Examiners).
73143 Fla. 236, 241, 196 So. 491, 493 (1940).
74
State ex tel. Page v. Hollingsworth, 117 Fla. 288, 157 So. 887 (1934). Notice had
been served upon the Commissioner of Agriculture, since the accused was an
inmate of the Florida State Prison; it is now required that notice be served upon
both the Commissioner and the prisoner. FLA. STAT. §47.26 (1955).
75State ex tel. Sbordy v. Rowlett, 125 Fla. 562, 170 So. 311 (1936); State ex tel.
Riley v. Rowlett, 125 Fla. 577, 170 So. 317 (1936).
7BNoel v. State ex rel. Siers, 125 Fla. 344, 170 So.114 (1936); State ex rel. Tullidge
v. Hollingsworth, infra note 77.
77State ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth, 108 Fla. 607, 146 So. 660 (1933).
781d. at 610, 146 So. at 661.
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b. Hearing
The question of whether hearing may ever be dispensed with in
adjudication may be answered generally in the negative. The exceptions to this rule occur principally in federal practice when no
judicially recognized right is involved7 9 The Florida Supreme Court,
however, has been emphatic in its insistence on the right to hearing in
administrative adjudications. 0 It reasons that "administrative orders,
quasi-judicial in character, are void if a hearing was denied .
82
The right to a hearing, however, may be waived.
In Dade County News Dealers Supply Co. v. Florida Railroad &
Public Utilities Commission83 the Florida Court approved a rule providing that hearing might be had after agency action had been taken
against an individual. A statute84 had made it illegal to use telephone
and telegraph wires in the transmission of information to be used
for gambling purposes. Under a rule promulgated in pursuance to
the act the company was notified that its telephone service was to be
discontinued. In the resulting litigation the rule was challenged
on the ground that no opportunity to protest prior to discontinuance
was afforded. The Court held that, since the rule provided for hearing
after discontinuance of service, it could not be held to be unreasonable.
If it were shown that some equitable right were violated, hearing
might be had before the effective date of an order of discontinuance.
The purpose of the act was to check illegal gambling activities. To
require that discontinuance must follow only on hearing would mean
delay that could last for weeks or months. The effectiveness of the
statute was assured by approving immediate discontinuance yet mak70See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950);
Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aLfd by an evenly divided Court,
341 U.S. 918 (1951).
8OState ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth, supra note 77; State ex rel. Hathaway
v. Smith, 160 Fla. 485, 489, 35 So.2d 650, 652 (1948) (dictum). The Court has also
held that a convict whose sentence is conditionally suspended is entitled to a hearing
on alleged violations of the conditions. Vason v. State, 76 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1954);
Hadsock v. State, 159 Fla. 893, 32 So.2d 844 (1947); Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32

So.2d 607 (1947).
8lState ex rel. Burr v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 93 Fla. 104, 107, 111 So. 391, 392
(1927); accord, State ex rel. Railroad Comm'rs v. Florida E.C. Ry., 64 Fla. 112, 59

So. 385 (1912).
s82State ex rel. Weathers v. Davis, 143 Fla. 250, 196 So. 487 (1940).
8348 So.2d 89 (Fla. 1950).
84FIa. Laws 1949, c. 25016, now FLA. STAT. §365.03 (1955).
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ing it possible for the innocent to prove their cases.
When life, health, or public safety is immediately at stake, summary
administrative action is possible, though the courts jealously watch
its use. The rule generally followed is that necessary action may be
taken immediately without denying due process and that those against
whom summary action is taken are entitled to resort to the courts.
In Campoamor v. State Live Stock Sanitary Board 5 the Florida Supreme Court set out its position on this matter. Board inspectors acting
under a valid quarantine attempted to enter Campoamor's premises
to inspect his herd for Bang's disease and to destroy any infected
animals. They were refused admittance, and Campoamor sought
judicial aid to prevent the inspection and possible destruction of his
cattle. The Court held that such emergency summary proceedings
were justifiable and within due process so long as they went no further
than reasonably necessary to meet the situation.8*
In addition to the limitations contained in statutes and the restriction to "reasonably necessary" action, the clear holdings are to the
effect that due process requires an opportunity to be heard after the
action is taken. The legality of the summary action may be tested
in a later, judicial proceeding. In this manner the fundamental re87
quirements of procedural due process are met.
Conduct of the Hearing. The manner in which hearings are conducted before administrative agencies is characterized by informality.
85136 Fla. 451, 182 So. 277 (1938).
86In a situation such as that represented by this case the element of notice is

ostensibly contained in the action leading to the promulgation of the quarantine
rule and that of hearing in the inspection conducted before destruction. According
to FLA. STAT. §585.09 (1955), condemnation and destruction of animals and property by the Livestock Sanitary Board may take place only after a fair appraisal by
three disinterested persons. If the owner of the animals or property refuses to
agree as to a fair value, however, the Board after 5 days may proceed summarily.
Apparently, under the holding of the Court in the Campoamor derision, this provision was meant merely to placate affected individuals or forestall later judicial
proceedings. The demands of due process are not violated by any action reasonably
necessary to meet the situation.
8TThe rule of the United States Supreme Court in North American Cold
Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 316 (1908), is applicable: "If a party cannot
get his hearing in advance of the seizure and destruction he has the right to have
it afterward, which right may be claimed upon the trial in an action brought for
the destruction of his property, and in that action those who destroyed it can only
successfully defend if the jury shall find the fact of unwholesomeness as claimed by
them."
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The Florida Court has recognized this by observing that such administrative agencies possess "the advantage of dispensing with ordinary
formalities and delays usually found unavoidable in court proceedings
. ...
'88 This does not mean, however, that agencies may disregard
proper rules of procedure and conduct hearings in any way that
they choose. Procedural rules and principles imposed by statutes
and organic law, as defined and interpreted by the courts, must be
observed.
When a cause of action is brought before an agency, whether
initiated by an individual or by the agency itself, it is not necessary
that formal, highly technical steps be taken. When statutes or agency
rules of procedure prescribe a regularized pattern of action, that procedure must be followed. In Florida formal rules of procedure are
followed only in agencies such as the Industrial Commission and the
Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, for in these agencies the
volume of business is so heavy that formal rules are necessary for the
expedition of business. In the great majority of Florida agencies emphasis on formal procedure is somewhat less, as the following statement of the Supreme Court illustrates:8 9
"[Wie deem it appropriate ... to point out that charges before
boards, such as the State Board of Dental Examiners, need not
be stated with the technical nicety or formal exactness required
of pleadings in the courts, nor are the proceedings before the
Board required to conform in every respect to that controlling
strictly in judicial proceedings."
Within general limits, then, procedure before administrative boards
and commissions must be regularized and standardized only to the
extent that procedural due process will be assured.
Florida administrative agencies generally have adequate legal
counsel, but the legal personnel do not usually conduct the adjudicatory hearings. This is a function performed either by agency members themselves or by appointed examiners. Only to the extent that
legal counsel or members of legal staffs happen to be examiners, or
that examiners happen to be attorneys, is the conduct of hearings left
to lawyers.
In Florida most hearings are conducted by board members themSsState ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 200, 156 So. 705, 707 (1934).
sold. at 206, 156 So. at 709.
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selves, but in the larger agencies, notably the Industrial Commission
and the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, this function is
usually assigned to examiners. In fact, statutes require that initial
hearings and determinations on claims before the Industrial Commission must be conducted and determinations made by hearing examiners. 9o The practice followed by the Railroad Commission is that
the commissioners themselves hear all "important" cases, while those
considered "minor" are scheduled for hearing by examiners. 91 All
controversies arising under the insurance laws are heard by deputy
insurance commissioners.
Of fundamental importance in the process of adjudication is the
question of what rights an individual may claim in adjudicatory hearings. In one case the Florida Supreme Court found: 92
"EThe accused] was not given the right to confront his accusers and cross-examine the witnesses against him, or to produce witnesses in his defense or to appear personally or by
counsel as the law provides. These rights are fundamental to
the accused and their observance on the part of respondents
is made mandatory but so far as the record shows they were
completely ignored."
Due process requires that none of the rights to a fair hearing be
denied or abridged. 93 Viewed in this manner, it makes little difference
9oFLA. STAT. §440.25 (3) (1955) provides that workmen's compensation claims upon
which hearings are necessary shall be conducted by a deputy commissioner. Sec.
443.07 (3) (a) states that determinations on unemployment compensation claims shall
be made by an examiner. Sec. 443.07 (4) (a) provides that appeals from decisions of
examiners in unemployment cases are to be heard by appeals referees, who are required to be members of the bar.
91The Railroad and Public Utilities Commission maintains a few part-time examiners, who are practicing attorneys. The need for only a few examiners is explained by the fact that members of the legal department and executive officers of
the Commission are sometimes used as examiners.
92State ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth, 103 Fla. 801, 803, 138 So. 372, 373
(1931); see note 53 supra.
93In State ex rel. Munch v. Davis, 143 Fla. 236, 243, 196 So. 491, 494 (1940), the
Court said: "The law contemplates that the accused shall have the right to appear
at the hearing, examine documents offered against him, . . . and to produce
witnesses in his behalf, and the statute contemplates that he shall attend the hearing
personally or by counsel." Although this was a construction of the statute involved,
the Court included the right to defend in administrative hearings in the concept
of due process. Accord, State ex rel. Weathers v. Davis, 143 Fla. 250, 196 So. 487
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whether statutes provide simply for a fair hearing or enumerate the
rights that must be accorded to individuals. In this sense they cannot
be altered by statute.
Fair hearing also means that the agency members or examiners
before whom hearings are conducted shall be impartial and unbiased.9 ' Federal courts generally hold that if members of a commission, or examiners, have an interest in a controversy, that is, if they
stand to gain or lose in a material way, the parties involved may
justly complain of bias. 95 Attitude or philosophy alone does not constitute bias, however. In Florida the question of bias apparently has
not proved a serious problem, for the Supreme Court has considered
96
the topic on a few occasions but has never discussed it fully.
Decision Making
At the conclusion of adjudicatory hearings agencies formalize
their decisions by issuing "orders." These orders, duly recorded and
filed, represent the final administrative disposition of the controversies to which they pertain. They are not final, however, in the
ultimate sense, for in Florida they are subject to review by the courts
on various grounds and by various methods. 97
(1940).

94State ex rel. Sbordy v. Rowlett, 125 Fla. 562, 170 So. 311 (1936); Miami v.
Huttoe, 38 So.2d 819, 820 (Fla. 1949) (dictum).
5See DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 365-85 (1951), for an extensive summation of
case law on this subject.
OSee, e.g., State Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers v. Cooksey, 148
Fla. 271, 4 So.2d 253 (1941). A funeral director appealed the revocation of his
license on the ground that the Board was not an impartial functionary because the
members were practitioners, as required by statute. The Court in rejecting this
contention merely stated that the statute did not place any member in an inconsistent position, but that if there was personal interest or prejudice in a particular
case the Board should act without that member. In Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida
Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board, 134 Fla. 1, 183 So. 759 (1938), the Court upheld
a statute providing that members of a regulatory board must be actively engaged
in the field regulated.
97In State ex rel.Burr v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 90 Fla. 721, 749, 106 So. 576,
586 (1925), the Court, in reference to orders of the Railroad Commission, said: "Such
orders, rules and regulations are not final adjudications, and they are subject to
" Further, an administrative controversy is not
appropriate judicial review ....
a "case" until it is appealed to the regular courts. South Atlantic S.S. Co. v. Tutson,
139 Fla. 405, 190 So. 675 (1939). But cf. State ex rel. Bie v. Swope, 159 Fla. 17, 30
So.2d 748 (1947), in which the Court decided that a statute was not sufficiently
clear to vest the Florida Real Estate Commission with jurisdiction to make final
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In the federal jurisdiction, during the last twenty years considerable controversy has waxed and waned over the institutional decision,18
which involves the question of whether the actual decision must be
made by the person who hears in the first instance. No serious problem on this issue has been presented in Florida, for in most agencies
adjudicatory hearings are infrequent and members of the agencies
are able both to hear and decide. Only the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission and the Industrial Commission have hearing schedules that foreclose the possibility of agency heads or members conducting all hearings. In the case of the Industrial Commission statutes
provide that decisions on both workmen's compensation and unemployment compensation must be made in the first instance by examiners, and such decisions become final unless appealed. 9 As previously
noted, the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission has developed
a practice of having the commissioners hear and decide important
cases, while examiners hear and tentatively decide minor cases. The
examiner does not enter a final order but simply submits a "proposed order," which may be adopted, modified, or rejected. The end
result is much the same as in the case of the Industrial Commission,
for the proposed orders are usually accepted.
A valid order should be based on findings of fact. In most instances the requirement is a statutory one; but, whether included in
statute or not, the Florida Court in numerous instances has taken
the position that a valid order must be based on findings of fact. 00
orders and judgments in regard to revocation of licenses.
9sAn institutional decision is defined by DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 330 (1951),
as "a decision made by an organization and not by an individual or solely by
agency heads." The controversy was touched off by the ruling in the first case of
Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936), that the person who hears the case
in the first instance must be the one who decides. Since most statutes confer
hearing powers upon agency heads, this would mean that the heads of the federal
departments would be required to hear all such cases. If applied literally such a
holding would have all but throttled the effective conduct of administrative business. In a famous series of cases by the same name, the holding of Morgan I was
largely thrown out. Several state courts, however, followed the lead of Morgan I.
See Davis, op. cit. supra. at 336-43 for a review of such state decisions.
99See note 90 supra.
IoE.g., Panama City Stevedoring Co. v. Padgett, 149 Fla. 687, 6 So.2d 822 (1942);
Central Truck Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 118 Fla. 555, 160 So. 26 (1935);
Florida Real Estate Comm'n ex rel. Holly Hill Grove & Fruit Co. v. Crisp, Ill Fla.
600, 149 So. 543 (1933); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Wells, 100 Fla. 1631, 131 So. 777
(1931); Jacksonville v. L'Engle, 20 Fla. 344 (1883).
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In one case, 1' 1 while stating that proper procedure includes the
making of findings, the Court nevertheless upheld the revocation of
a license even though the order was unsupported by findings of fact.
Once an order is duly made and recorded the administrative decision is, for all practical purposes, administratively final. Rehearings,
however, may be granted or orders amended. The Court has held that
the Railroad Commission is "possessed of power, inherent from the
nature of the administrative functions it is required to perform...
to grant a rehearing of its decisions in appropriate cases."' 102 Administrative rehearing is infrequent in Florida agencies, perhaps because rules of procedure are in most instances unwritten and judicial
03
review is usually available.
Just as an administrative agency may grant a rehearing, it may
04
also modify or amend its orders. The Supreme Court has stated:
"The law is ...well settled that the Railroad Commission,
like a Court, may of its own motion or by request correct or
amend any order still under its control without notice and
hearing to parties interested, provided such parties cannot suffer
by reason of the correction or amendment, or if the matters
corrected and amended were embraced in testimony taken at a
previous hearing."
It should be noted that the only cases available on this topic relate
to the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission. The principles
evolved in these cases, however, are applicable to other agencies.
CONCLUSION

The branch of law dealing with the powers and procedures of
lOlLittle Man's Club v. Schott, 60 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1952).
lo-sMatthews v. State ex rel. Andrews Bay Transportation Co., 111 Fla. 587, 591,
149 So. 648, 649 (1933).
2oaJudicial review of administrative determinations in Florida is not properly
within the scope of this article. At the risk of dangerous generalization, it may be
noted that Florida courts have been lenient in granting review, and review once
granted has tended to be broader than would be accorded in most other jurisdictions
under analogous circumstances.
'04State ex rel. Burr v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 93 Fla. 104, 107, Ill So. 391, 392
(1927). In Leonard Brothers Transfer & Storage Co. v. Douglass, 159 Fla. 510, 32
So.2d 156 (1947), the Court invalidated an amended order of the Railroad Commission because it extended beyond the scope of the hearing.
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administrative agencies is still largely in its formative stage. Florida
administrative law is far from being as mature and complex as its
federal counterpart. Nor does it approach the degree of complexity
of the administrative law of several of the more populous and industrialized states. There is an imperative necessity for much study
and research on the principles and problems of Florida administrative
law and procedure. The deficiencies and shortcomings, as well as
the strengths, can be understood only by a closer application to this
relatively new and growing field.
Since the administrative organs of government are in more and
more instances the source of much public policy and the situs of
adjudication, it is essential that these phases of the administrative
process be analyzed. This method of propounding public policy and
of determining, at least initially, individual rights and obligations is
a serious matter; resort to it will be more, not less, frequent in future
years. The administrative process is a twentieth century necessity.
The task of bench, bar, and publicists is to insure that its great values
are maintained and strengthened and its weaknesses corrected.
Florida administrative law has thus far been concentrated by and
large on the definition of areas of activity and the setting of limits
on administrative action. This phase is a fundamental one, historically,
in the development of new branches of law. A considerable job of
classification has been accomplished.
The battle over accepting the administrative agency as a valid
instrument for exercising governmental authority has been won.
There is evidence that the second phase has begun or is beginning.
The concern is now with stumbling first efforts to organize this body
of knowledge into a somewhat cohesive unit, which in turn will
assume its rightful place in the corpus of Florida law. The act on
compulsory filing of administrative regulations is one such step.
Many others will be required. A tremendous amount of statutory
analysis and amendment is badly needed as a first step toward regularization of procedure.
Emphasis on procedure alone is not, of course, enough. The
flexibility of the administrative process in Florida must be retained;
the agencies must not be placed in legal strait jackets. If this be the
result of present efforts to bring Florida administrative law to maturity, the effort will have been in vain.
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